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This article studies the evolution ofthe Bank ofJapan's methods of
implementing monetary policy since the move tofloating exchange rates
in 1973. Analysisofboth institutional changesandempiricaldata on the
central bank's behavior suggests that the Bank ofJapan has followed a
flexible approach to monetary policy. Japan's move away from direct
creditcontrols towardmoreflexible short-terminterestrates overthepast
decade does not represent a "money-focused" monetary policy in the
sense ofa close adherence to a constant money growth rule.
The Bank of Japan's success in maintaining the
lowestrate ofprice inflation among the majorindus-
trial countries since the mid-1970s has been a
source ofenvy for many central bankers, especially
since low inflation was accomplished without a
majorrecession even afterthe second oilprice shock
in 1979. There are many reasons for this success,
butthe dominantview cites the gradualdeceleration
oftrend money growth overthe lastdecade (Chart 1)
as the Bank ofJapan moved to a so-called "money
focused" monetary policy (Suzuki, 1985).
A number of academic economists and others
have therefore pointed to monetary policy in Japan
as a potential model, at least in part, for the Federal
Reserve to emulate. Some ofthese economists have
interpreted the Bank ofJapan's policy as following
classic "monetarist policy prescriptions" 1, even
though the Bank ofJapan does not publicly state a
policy objective that suggests atraditional monetar-
ist strategy ofstrict adherence to a pre-determined
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money growth rule. An Executive Director of the
Bank ofJapan has stated that ". . . even though the
Bank ofJapan emphasizes the money supply, we are
not blind to other indicators. We consider money
supply movements in an overall framework that
includes prices, output, the balance of payments,
interest rates at home and abroad, and attitudes of
financial intermediaries to lending."2
The objective of this paper is to investigate the
extent to which monetary policy in Japan has fol-
lowed a "monetarist" strategy in practice, as
opposed to the publicly stated policy ofan eclectic
approach. This article studies the constraints on
policy in Japan and the evolution of the Bank of
Japan's methods of implementing monetary policy
since the move to floating exchange rates in 1973.
(The pre-1973 obligation to fix the yen/dollar rate
closely tied Japanese monetary policy to foreign
influences and thereby limited the Bank ofJapan's
discretion.) It analyses both institutional changes
and empirical data on the behavior of the Bank of
Japan.
Our approach does not attempt to answer the
broaderquestions ofwhy inflation has been low and
output stable in Japan over the last decade. By
focusing on the Bank ofJapan's behavior, however,
we are able to shed lighton whetherJapan's success
with managing inflation was occurring in tandem
with the implementation of a so-called monetarist
policy strategy.The paper is divided into four sections. The first
presents a simple framework for understanding the
process of monetary policy and distinguishing
between monetarist policy and nonmonetarist pol-
icy. This section defines terms and draws out both
institutional factors and empirical regularities that
are likely to be associated with a monetarist policy
strategy. The second section investigates the institu-
tional aspects ofthe evolutionofthe BankofJapan's
operating techniques and procedures over the last
decade. The institutional evidence is compared to
. theaprioripredictions associated with amonetarist
strategy. The third section ofthe paper is empirical,
ang irtvestigates whether the Japanese experience
fits a number of implications and predictions of
traditional monetarism. The final section draws
some policy implications from the analysis.
I. Defining A "Monetarist" Policy: Tactics and Strategy
Monetary policy may conceptually be divided
into several operational stages that help to dis-
tinguish a "monetarist" policy from adiscretionary
counter-cyclical policy. Schematically, the basic




The goals ofmonetary policy generally are set in
terms of growth of real GNP, employment, and
prices, with perhaps a balance of payments or
exchange rate objective or constraint. The instru-
ments ofpolicy are variables over which the central
bank has more or less direct control, such as the
level ofborrowed and nonborrowed reserves, inter-
bank interest rates, the discount rate, the level of
reserve requirements and, perhaps, the quantity of
banklending.
In general, the policy instruments do not affect
the ultimate policy goals directly. Thus, in manip-
ulating its instruments to achieve the ultimate goals
of policy, central banks generally set targets for
some intermediate variables. The intermediate vari-
ables, such as various money aggregates or market
interest rates, are assumed to exert an important
influence on the variables that have been selected as
the ultimate goals ofpolicy. Presumably, the central
bank can exert greater direct control (less "slip-
page")overthe intermediate variables than over the
ultimate policy goals through its manipulation of
operating instruments. In other words, the inter-
mediatevariables are used as links in the implemen-
tation ofpolicy.
The strategy ofmonetarypolicy involves both the
choice of the intermediate target variables and the
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target ranges deemed necessary to obtain the
desired final policy goals. The tactics of policy
involve the choice ofoperating instrument variables
designed to control the intermediate targets.
The most important distinction between "mon-
etarists" and "non-monetarists" in terms ofpolicy
prescriptions involves the appropriate monetary
policy strategy, that is, the choice of intermediate
target and the stand onwhetherintermediatetargets
should be varied to attempt to counteract business
cycle fluctuations. To be specific, a monetarist
strategy would choose a money aggregate as an
intermediate target (as opposed to market interest
rates ora broad measure ofcredit) and set it to grow
at a fairly steady rate - some would suggest a
constant rate (Friedman, 1960). Traditional mon-
etarist policy strategy argues against varying the
intermediatetargetincounter-cyclicalpolicy moves
designed to "fine tune" the economy. Its reasoning
is that such attempts usually lead to greater uncer-
tainty in the economy, and exacerbate, rather than
dampen, swings in the business cycle.
The pursuit of a monetarist pplicy strategy is
likely to be associated with a particular institutional
framework and a numberofempirical implications,
several of which are investigated below for Japan's
experience. The institutional framework must make
available policy instruments that are effective in
targeting money as an intermediate objective.
Enough variation in the operating instruments (for
example, interbank interest rates) must be allowed
within the framework to permitfairly precise mone-
tary control ifa monetary strategy is followed. That
is, the tactics of policy must be consistent with a
monetarist strategy.
In terms of empirical predictions, the transition
from a non-monetarist to a monetaristpolicy regimeis expected to be associated with less money vari-
ability and, perhaps, greaterinterestrate variability
(to the extentthatmaintainingsteadymoney growth
precludes the central bankfrom "smoothing" inter-
est rate fluctuations). Moregenerally, the stochastic
time series properties ofthe money stock normally
would be significantly different under the two reg-
imes. In particular, onewouldexpectstrongernega-
tive correlations between moneygrowthin the pres-
ent period and its past values under a monetarist
regime because any past deviations from constant
money growth would tend to be offset incurrentand
future periods.
A final point concerns the feedback relationship
between the central bank's operating instruments
and the intermediate target. Under a monetarist
policy regime, there would be two-way feedback
betweenthe control instruments and theintermedi-
ate target: the operating instruments would be sys-
tematically setto move future money growthtoward
the targeted range. Also, the central bank would
systematically consider past money growth (par-
ticularly swings outside the target range) when it
determines the current value ofits operating instru-
ment.
II. Monetary Policy in Japan: Institutional Features
The traditional tactics of monetary policy in
Japan have emphasized control ofinterbank interest
rates, direct credit controls on commercial bank
lending, and changes in both the official discount
rate and reserve requirement ratios.
Monetary policy by the Bank ofJapan on a day-
to~day basis has traditionally focused on control of
the interbank money market, which consists largely
of call loans and commercial bills traded among
financial institutions. Similar to the role of the
Federal Reserve in the federal funds market in the
United States, the Bank of Japan is able to exert
control over interbank interest rates by influencing
the level of aggregate reserves available to the
banking system. Japanese financial institutions are
required to maintain legal reserves on their deposit
liabilities with the Bank of Japan. By exerting
various degrees of aggregate "reserve restraint,"
the central bank can influence conditions in the
interbankmarketwhere banks tradereserves among
themselves and thereby affect the call money and
commercial bill interest rates.
The link between the Bank ofJapan's restraint on
bank reserves and interbank interest rates has tradi-
tionally been rather direct. In particular, a large
percentageoftotal reserve assets postedatthe Bank
of Japan by financial institutions are "borrowed
reserves" subject to recall at the discretion of the
monetary authorities.3
The reserve requirements system in Japan
amounts to a mixbetweena contemporaneous and a
lagged reserve system.4 Financial institutions affili-
ated with the system are required to place legal
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reserves (vaultcashisnotincluded) withthe Bankof
Japan, in an amountequalto the monthly average of
outstandingdeposits (calculatedfrom the first day to
the last day of the month) times the reserve ratio,
during a reserve maintenance period beginning
from the 16th day ofthe month through the 15thday
ofthe following month. Each institutioncanchoose
its daily rate ofreserve accumulation during a given
reserve maintenance period. The "reserve progress
ratio" on any day is the ratio for the current mainte-
nance period of reserve deposits accumulated to
reserve deposits required for the period.
The Bank of Japan is able to raise interbank
interest rates by limiting overall creditprovisions to
financial institutions, and thereby maintain a low
aggregate reserve progress ratio during the greater
partofthe reserve maintenanceperiod. As financial
institutions attempt to meet the required reserves
ratio by the end ofthe maintenance period and run
up against the Bank ofJapan's greater reluctance to
extend more credit, they tum to the interbank mar-
ket. Greater competition for funds in the interbank
market cause interbank interest rates to rise.
Although the Bank of Japan adjusts its credit to
financial institutions to allow financial institutions'
reserve deposits (eventually) to meet their legal
reserve requirements, interbank interest rates nev-
ertheless tend to rise during periods of "reserve
restraint." This is because the Bank of Japan's
"moral suasion" during periods ofrestraint causes
financial institutions to become reluctant to extend
their borrowed reserves credit lines, and to prefer to
purchase reserves from the interbank market.In effect, the Bank of Japan's attitude toward
lending comprises an important, although supple-
mentary, element in the Bank's control over inter-
bankinterestrates. Itcauses financial institutions to
distinguishbetweenreserves obtained directly from
central bank credit and reserves obtained through
theinterbankmarket. Moreover, theBankofJapan's
lending operations have an especially large influ-
ence over interbank rates because excess reserves
held by financial institutions are generally very
small.5
Another instrument ofmonetary control in Japan
thathas been importantas a supplementary measure
is the central bank's direct quantitative control over
commercialbanklending(so-called "windowguid-
ance"). Window guidance is also a form of "moral
suasion" that has been used at times of monetary
restraint when the Bank of Japan wanted to limit
deposits and money creation by limiting the
increase in the total loan volume of individual
banks.
Individual banks have apparently not resisted
"window guidance" partly because of their heavy
dependence on borrowed reserves from the Bank of
Japan, and partly because they perceive that long-
term customer relations would not be adversely
affected by following credit controls during periods
ofgeneral credit restraint. Moreover, during periods
of monetary restraint (when interbank rates are
rising) the cost of funds to banks increases. Since
their loan rates are also subject to administrative
"guidance" and, as a consequence, are fairly rigid
(Suzuki, 1985; p. 6), this induces them to reduce
their lending.6
Although monetary control in Japan has tradi-
tionally worked primarily through Bank of Japan's
credit adjustments and, as a supplementary mea-
sure, direct controls on banklending, changes in the
official discount rate and reserve requirement ratios
also have been important instruments.7 These latter
instruments are employed much less frequently, and
have served bothto "signal" and to make responses
Chart 1
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36to changing economic conditions and significant
changes in underlying policies.
The BankofJapan has used a numberofseparate
instruments to accommodate seasonal fluctuations
in money demand, as opposed to implementillg
short and medium-term policy actions and accom-
modating longer term money demand growth.
Largely in response to seasonal "surplus" funds,
the Bank ofJapan sells bills ofexchange drawn on
itselfto short-term money market dealers to tighten
money market conditions. Similarly, the Bank pur-
chases private commercial bills possessed by finan-
cial institutions (again viashort-termmoney market
dealers) in large part to provide credit to accommo-
date seasonal shortages in the interbank market.
These operations are analogous to Federal Reserve
repurchase agreements (repos) and matched sale-
purchases of securities designed to even out seaso-
nal money market swings.
In contrast, the Bank of Japan supplies base
money growth over longer periods largely by pur-
chasing government securities (IO-yeargovernment
bonds) directly from financial institutions. Prior to
1963, the Bank of Japan concentrated most credit
expansion in direct lendings to financial institu-
tions. Analogous Federal Reserve operations are
outright purchases of government bills and coupon
securities.
Changes in Monetary Policy Tactics
The Bank ofJapan's basic tactics for implement-
ing monetary policy have Qhanged in two major
ways since the mid-1970s. The Bank has encour-
aged greater interest rate flexibility and de-empha-
sized credit controls, although adjusting reserves
and controlling interbank interest rates through its
lendingto financial institutionsremain the predomi-
nant instruments ofshort- and medium-term mone-
tary policy.
Policymakers now attach greater emphasis on
daily movements ininterestrates as an instrumentof
policy. This new emphasis is reflected in Table 1
which shows increasingly frequent daily changes in
the interbank interestrate.8 Since 1981, the Bankof
Japan has also spurred interest rate flexibility
through sales of short-term government Treasury
bills. These sales have facilitated interest rate
arbitrage between the interbank and open markets.
Moreover, the terms on whicWlhe BankofJapan has
purchased governmentbonds from financial institu-
tions since 1978 have also gradually come to reflect
market forces. 9
Policymakers also have de-emphasized direct
quantitative controls on bank lending. 10 In particu-
lar, they have removed "window guidance" as a
bindingconditionon banklendingand, therefore, as
a means ofmonetary control in recent years. 11
37Changes in the relative emphasis of operating
instruments and greater flexibility in the interbank
interest rate operating target have occurred in tan-
dem with the liberalization ofopen market interest
rates in Japan. Greater flexibility of open market
interest rates and development of secondary
securities markets have increased the importance of
the interest rate channel in transmitting monetary
policyto the economy(Suzuki 1985, Cargill 1986).
Inthis sense, a broader "opportunity set," orselec-
tion, ofchannels oftransmission are now available
to the Bank of Japan in its pursuit of monetary
policy objectives.
Taken in this context, neither the relaxation of
controls on commercial bank lending nor greater
emphasis on interbank day-to-day interest rate flex-
ibility necessarily represents a move to the monetar-
ist strategy of targeting a money aggregate. The
switch in the Bank of Japan's tactics is equally
consistent with targeting open market interest rates
as an intermediate objective. However, in light of
Japan's move to floating exchange rates, and conse-
quentelimination ofthe formal obligationto pursue
a monetary policy strategy consistent with main-
taining fixed exchange rate parities, the shift in
policy tactics is broadly consistent, orat least com-
patible, with the hypothesis that the Bank ofJapan
has adopted a monetarist strategy.
Other institutional evidence also appears consis-
tent with the view that the Bank of Japan is now
placing greater emphasis on the control of money
aggregates than in the past. This evidence includes
boththenumberofpolicystatementsby the Bankof
Japan since the mid-1970s12 and the announcement
sinceJuly 1978 ofquarterly money "projections" as
a broad measure of money growth (M2+CDs).13
Moreover, while officials of the Bank of Japan
indicate that they are paying greater attention to the
growth of money aggregates in conducting policy,
they also stress that they are giving a smaller role to
lending by financial institutions as an intermediate
target (Fukui, 1986).
III. Short-term Monetary Policy in Japan:
Empirical Regularities
Traditional monetarism makes extensive use of
money aggregates as an intermediate target. In this
section, we study the empirical evidence on the
extent to which the Japanese central bank's pre-
sumed "money focused" policy follows the tradi-
tional model. 14
Since interbank interest rates remain the Bank of
Japan's direct operating target, we look at the extent
to which the central bank attempts to maintain
money growth along a predetermined path by sys-
tematically changing the interbank interest rate. As
discussed, one would expect to observe signifi-
cantly less money variability and significantly
greater interest rate variability under a money tar-
getingregime.
Data Trends
Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations
ofseveral key monthly economic statistics in Japan
(M2 + CDs, interest rates, industrial production
and consumer price inflation) for the floating
38
exchange rate period 1973-1985. The post-1973
sample was chosen because it represents a funda-
mental departure from the money supply process
associated with a fixed exchange rate regime, and
also because empirical work by Okubo (1983) and
Hamada and Hayashi (1985) suggests that the
money supply process shifted in 197315• Moreover,
work by Blundell-Wignall, et al. (1984) and
Hamada and Hayashi (1985) suggest structural
change in the money demand function in 1973 that
was potentially related to shifts in monetary reg-
imes.
The focus onthepost-1973 periodis important. A
number of researchers (for example, Meltzer 1985
and Friedman 1985) have contrasted the fixed and
floating rate periods. They have emphasized the
switch in monetary regimes and the simultaneous
falling-off in the average rate ofmoney (M2+CD)
growth from 16.2percent (s.a.a.r.) between the first
quarter of 1960 and the first quarter of 1973 to 10
percentbetween the second quarter of 1973 and thethird quarter of 1985, and the decline in money
variability (the standard deviation fell from 12 per-
cent to 3 percent the two periods).
The pre-1973 period, however, cannotbe reason-
ably considered a discretionary policy regime and
used as a basis of comparison. Under the fixed
exchangerate systemthatprevailedbefore 1973, the
central bank was given only a limited degree of
discretion in its conduct of policy. The need to
maintain fixed exchange parities meant that domes-
tic monetary policy was subject to foreign money
shocks. Moreover, as emphasized by Okina (1985),
structural change after the mid-1970s could be
associated with the first oil shock as well as a switch
in monetary policy rules or the shift to floating
exchange rates. Our analysis ofthe extent to which
the Bank ofJapan has followed "monetarist" policy
prescriptions therefore focuses on the period since
1973.
Also shown in Table 2 is a division ofthe sample
into periods before and afterJuly 1978- the dateof
the first quarterly money supply "projection" in
Japan. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the date of
an abrupt shift in the BankofJapan's policy regime,
most Japanese policymakers have indicated the lat-
ter 1970s as a time of gradual change and would
clearly include the post-1978 period as falling
within the new "money focused" regime.
Table 2 and Chart 1 clearly indicate that average
money growth and inflation in Japan have been
declining since the mid-1970s. Somewhat sur-
prisingly, the month-to-month variance of money
around both its mean and (declining) trend growth
has increased since the introductionofmoney "fore-
casts" in July 1978. This is true whether money
growth is measured on a month-to-month, quarter-
to-quarter, or semi-annual basis. And even though
the interbankinterestratemoves more frequently on
39a day-to-day basis than before(Table I), Table 2and
Chart I clearly show thatits monthly variability has
declined somewhat since July 1978. Putdifferently,
its monthly variability has not increased as one
might have expected if the Bank of Japan had
closely followed monetary targeting. 16 The vari-
ability ofoutput growth, in contrast, is roughly the
same in both periods. Mean output growth,
however, rose sharply from 1.6 percent during the
period 1973-1978 to 4.4 during the period
1978-1985.
Another summary measure ofinterestis the auto-
correlation function ofmoney (expressed in month-
to-month percent changes), which is the correlation
ofmoney with its past values. The function is useful
in determining whether there is any particular pat-
tern in the money time series. A sharp shift in the
autocorrelation functions between pre- and
post-1978periodswouldindicateamajordifference
in the time series pattern of money. The switch
toward a more monetarist regime (constant money
growth rule) would lead one to expect, a priori,
greater negative autocorrelations because any past
deviations from constant money growth (picked up
in the constant term) would presumably be offsetin
current and future periods.
A comparison ofthe two periods, shown inChart
2, indicates that the stochastic process generating
M2 + CDs in Japan was virtually unchanged
between the two periods, although the first two
autocorrelations increased slightly. Both series are
clearly dominated by seasonality factors, but all the
autocorrelations are nevertheless very close. There
is no evidence ofa significant and systematic move
to a constant money growth rule.
Causality Tests
The discussion above emphasizesthatone should
observe a systematic two-way feedback between the
operating control instrument and the intermediate
Chart 2
Autocorrelation Function of M2 + CDs*
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40money targetundera monetaristpolicy strategy. We
used the Granger causality method to investigate
this relationship for the Bank of Japan's policy
actions(Granger, 1969).
TheGrangercausalitymethodasserts that a vari-
able x "Grangercauses" a variable y iffluctuations
inx can beusedto predictsubsequentmovementsin
y after taking into account other relevant informa-
tion (suchas pastvaluesofy andathirdvariable, z).
Similarly, y'''Grangercauses" xiffluctuations in y
can be used to predict subsequent movements in x.
When x "Granger causes" y, and y "Granger
causes" x, two-way feedback exists between the
variables. The phrase "Granger causes" is sub-
stituted for "causes" in order to emphasize the
particular statistical definition used and its statisti-
cal shortcomings (such as the limited information
set, potential contemporaneous correlation between
the endogenous variables, lag length selection, and
sample period).
We investigated causality in the context of a
three-variable, reduced-form system for the process
generating money (Mt), interest rates (it) and nomi-
nal retail sales (St) in Japan. Ourmainfocus was the
relationship between money and interest rates.
Retail sales were includedtocontrolfortheresponse
of money and interest rates to business cycle fluc-
tuations. Nominal values were used to capture both
output and price movements and therefore to save
degrees of freedom. Retail sales rather than GNP
was used because only the former is available on a
monthly basis. Ourmaintained structure therefore is
a system where Mt, it and St are jointly determined
endogenous variables. The reduced-form of the
model is:
Mt = L(1Tll)G Mt- I + L(1T12)P it-I + L(1TI3)N St-I + J.L1t
it = L(1TZI)GMt_1 + L(1Tz2)P it-I + L(1TZ3)N St-I + J.LZt
St = L(1T31)GMt_1 + L(1T32)P it_I + L(1T33)N St-I + J.L3t
(1)
where
Mt = M2 + CDs (percent change)
it = call money rates (percent change)
St = nominal retail sales (percent change)
L(.)i = the polynomial lag operator oforderj, that is, L(1TII)IZ Mt- I represents the 12coefficient values on
money lagged one to twelve periods.
41The 1TS are nonlinear functions ofthe parameters of
the maintained structure.
Theequations in 1 are the standard equations for
the Granger variant of causality testing. To the
extentthat interest rates are the primary monetary
operating instrument in Japan, and rate changes
influencethe money aggregates, L(1Td should be a
non-zero coefficient vector, that is, i "Granger
sense that values ofinterest
rates add relevant information to predicting money.
Similarly, ifthe Bank ofJapan were systematically
shifting its operating instrument- call money rates
- in response to a money aggregate intermediate
Objective, then the L(1TZI) coefficient vector would
be non-zero (M "Granger causes" i). If both the
L(1Tlz) = ohypothesis andtheL(1TzI)= Ohypoth-
esis could be rejected, then there would be "feed-
back" between money and interestrates as the basic
money targeting model (with short-term interest
rates as theprimaryoperating instruments) predicts.
Table 3 presents the F-statistic test results from
estimating the equation system 1. Money, interest
rates, and retail sales were expressed in monthly
percent changes to create stationary series. All
series were seasonally unadjusted, and seasonal
dummyvariables were includedintheregressions to
control for seasonal factors.
Lag length selection (parameters G, P and N in
system I) is potentially very important to the
causality test results. Twelve monthly lags were
chosenfor all ofthevariables inthe tests, butnopre-
testing of various lag lengths was conducted. The
twelve monthly lags were chosen based on various
policy statements by officials of the Bank ofJapan
regarding the period ofmonetary targeting. I?
The full sample (March 1973-September 1985)
results suggest significant unidirectional causality
running from interest rates to money, but no feed-
back causality from money to interest rates. Evi-
dence for the former lies inthe highly significant (at
the one percent level of confidence) coefficient of
lagged interest rates in the money equation in Table
3 (given a 3.81 F-statistic). The full-sample results
indicate that money adds no additional explanatory
power to that imbedded in past interest rates and
retail sales in predicting interbank interest rates (the
F-statistic is 0.69).
These results are consistent with the Bank of
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Japan's.policy statements and the precedingdiscus-
sionthatthe primaryoperatinginstrumentofmone-
tarypolicy was the interbank interest rate, and that
interest rates are an important channel for transmit-
ting monetary policy to the economy. Interest rates
clearly lead money in these results. However, the
resultsare notconsistentwith a practiceofsystema-
tic changes to the interbank rate operating control
deviations of money. If
money were an intermediate target closely followed
by the BankofJapan, then one would expectto find
two-way "feedback" between the money and inter-
estrate series. 18
It is possible, however, that the Bank of Japan
placed less emphasis on money in the period before
the beginning ofthe announced money projections
in July 1978. Then one may suspect that the full
sample results could be contaminated by the inclu-
sion ofthe earlier period. In particular, there is the
possibility that the August 1978-September 1985
period would show feedback causalityrunning from
money to interest rates, whereas the earlier March
1973-July 1978 period would not. 19
Table 3 results do, in fact, suggest a discernible
shift in the causal relationships between money and
interest rates. In particular, they indicate no evi-
dence to suggest that money "Granger causes"
interest rates or that interest rates "Granger cause"
money during the March 1973-July 1978 period. In
contrast, during the July 1978-September 1985
period following the beginning of money supply
"projections," there is clearcausality running from
interest rates to money. Again, however, this
causality is unidirectional, and money growth was
found not to Grangercause interest rates even inthe
more recent period. Thus, it appears that the
1978-85 period is dominating the full sample period
For the 1978-85 period, there is evidence that
changes in call money helped predict changes in
money growth but not that money growth sys-
tematically helps to predict the call money rate
policy instrument as would be the case if a precise
money target were followed by the Bank ofJapan.
This.finding nonetheless is consistent with the
Bank's policy pronouncements that it has placed
greater emphasis in recent years on the control of
interbank interest rates as the primary operatingvariable in implementing monetary policy. Itis also
consistent with the commonly accepted view that
interest rate fluctuations have grown in importance
asachannel ofmonetary policy transmissionto the
economy.
Overall, these causality test results provide some
supportfor the view that, inrecentyears, the mone-
tary authorities in Japan have placed a great deal
more •emphasis on interest rates, as opposed to
direct credit controls, as an operating target in
controlling the economy, includingmoney fluctua-
tions. There is, however, no evidence that the intro-
duction of money "projections" in Japan in July
1978 was associated with a statistically significant
and stablepolicy feedback rulerunning from money
to interest rates. Hence, there is little evidence to
suggest that the BankofJapan has closely adhered
to monetary targeting. It is noteworthy that this
conclusion also is consistent with the descriptive
statistics presented inTable 2. Those statistics show
that although average money growth has declined
steadily since the mid-1970s, its variance around
trend has remained largely unchanged since the
advent offloating exchange rates in 1973.
These results are consistent with other research
onthe relations between interest rates and money in
Japan, although the present interpretation of the
eviden<.;e is somewhatdifferent. Okubo (1983) uses
the relative power contribution method to analyze
causal relations among money, income, prices, and
interestrates ill.Japan during.several sample peri-
ods. Similar to the results presented above,Okubo
finds strong unidirectional causality running from
the call money rate to money after 1974 and also
concludes that this evidence·'\ . . supports the
usual contention that monetary control in Japan is
effected not by changes inthe (monetary)base, but
rather by adjustment of policy-influenced interest
rates" (p.•129). With no additional evidence,
however, he also implies that these results are con-
sistent with an "explicitly money-supply oriented"
Bank ofJapan policy. The analysis above questions
Okubo's interpretation of the regime shift in the
early 1970s.
Okina (1985), in a somewhat different context,
alsoexpresses somedoubtonthe significanceofthe
shift in the Bank of Japan's operating procedures.
He points to both the switch in exchange rate
regimes andthe aftermath ofthe first oilprice shock
as potential alternative candidates to explain lower
Japanese money and income variability betweenthe
pre- and post-1973 periods.
IV. Conclusion and Policy.lmplications
The environment in which monetary policy in
Japan is conducted has changed significantly since
the move to floating exchange rates in 1973. Along
with relaxation ofa formal exchange rate objective,
the BankofJapan'sbehaviorhas beenmodified by a
gradual liberalization ofthe Japanese financial sys-
tem: interestratedecontrol, thedevelopmentofnew
financial instruments and financial markets, and
fewer constraintsonthe assetand liabilitychoicesof
investors, borrowers, and financial institutions.
These developments, inturn, have broadened the
"opportunity set" of monetary policy instruments
available to the Bank ofJapan. In particular, the
transmission of interest rate changes to economic
activity is now more significant in the emerging
deregulated Japanese financial environment. Partly
in response to these changes, the BankofJapan has
emphasized interbank interest rates as the primary
operating instrument of policy to a greater extent
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than before, and has virtually discontinued direct
controls over commercial bank lending.
The empirical results suggest that the move away
from direct credit controls ("window guidance")
toward more flexible short-term interest rates does
not represent a "money focused" monetary policy
in the sense of a close adherence to a constant
money.growth rule. Inparticular, money variability
has notdeclinedinrecentyears incontrasttointerest
rate variability.
Moreover, it does not appear that up to a year's
lagged values ofmoney help to explain fluctuations
in the operating control variable ofthe central bank
(interbank interest rates). This indicates that the
Bank ofJapan.has not systematically moved inter-
bank interest rates in response to deviations of
money growth from its narrow targeted rlll1ge since
eitherthemove tofloating exchangerates in 1973or
the announcement ofmoney projections starting in1978. Nevertheless, we found clear causality run-
ning from interest rates to money in the later period
(1978-1985), indicating the greater importance of
the interest rate channel in transmitting monetary
policy changes to the economy in a deregulated
financial environment.
Acautiousinterpretationoftheseresults is appro-
priate. No statistical evidence was found to suggest
asystematic "causalfeedback" between money and
interest rates as even loose adherence to a money
supply rule would generate. Moreover, neither the
institutional nor the empirical evidence suggests
thatthe BankofJapan controls its interbank interest
rate operating instrument in a systematic fashion
designedto maintaincontrol (upto a year) ofmoney
aggregates along a fixed or gradually evolving pre-
determinedgrowth path. The evidence suggests that
a more flexible approach to policy is followed, and
that Japan's success at maintaining low and stable
inflation and stable output growth cannot be
attributed to its adoption of traditional monetarist
policy prescriptions.20
The task remains to identify the source of the
Bank ofJapan's success at slowing money growth.
Conscious policy action by the central bank may
have beenresponsible, butat leastthreeotherfactors
may have lowered the trend rate of money demand
growth. First, loweraverage inflation, perhaps asso-
ciatedwiththe rapid increase ininterest rates by the
BankofJapanin response to the second oil shock,
may have created less nominal money demand
growth. Second, the sharpdrop inthe growth rateof
potential real GNP in Japan following the first oil
price shock in 1973 may have lowered the trend
groWtl1 ofreal money demand.
Third, andperhapsmostintriguing, the decline in
trend money growth in Japan may simply be associ-
ated with the shift in the flows offunds away from
intermediary channels of finance toward direct
finance. 21 Inparticular, this shift has tended to slow
thegrowthofthebanking sectorandits liabilities-
a good part of which constitute broad money in
Japan.
The empirical evidence suggests that these
explanations, and other potential explanations as
well, serve as credible alternatives to the conven-
tional wisdom that attributes slower Japanese
money growth to aconscious systematic shift in the
Bank ofJapan's behavior since the latter 1970s.
FOOTNOTES
1. See Friedman (1985) and Greenwood (1985). Fried-
man, for example, recently stated that "... the Bank of
Japan has been the least monetarist central bank in its
rhetoric, the most monetarist in its policy ..." of all the
majorcentral banks.
2. Shimamoto, 1982, p. 82. Similarly, Suzuki (1985)
recently stated that"... the policy attitude of the Bank of
Japan over the past years ... is in my interpretation nei-
ther that of a post-Keynesian 'discretionary fine tuning' nor
that of an 'x percent rule.' It is discretionary in that it allows
for gradual tuning of monetary growth, and itconforms to a
rule in the sense that it stabilizes moneygrowth as much as
possibleand givesinformation to the public aboutpolicyin
the form of forecast announcements. An appropriate term
may be 'eclectic gradualism.'"
3. Lendings to financial institutions by the Bank of Japan
may be withdrawn at any time at the option of the Bank
(Fukui, 1986; p. 5).
4. The following discussion drawsheavilyon Fukui (1986),
particularly pages 3-4.
5. The Bank of Japan's ability to control money and credit
is also helped by the fact that almost all financial institu-
tions in Japan are required to join the reserve requirement
system. Moreover, all deposits by the general public at
financial institutions are reservable, with the exception of
"new money in trust," supplied by trust banks since the
end of 1985.
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6. The loan rates of deposit banks are less flexible than
interbank rates because prime lending rates are linked to
the •official discount rate, and the cost of funds is still
regulated except for CDs and money market certificates
(Suzuki, 1985; p. 6).
7. The Bank of Japan provides financial institutions with
loans at the official discount rate. Sincethe discount rate is
below the interbank call and bill money rates, there is
ordinarily an excess demand for the Bank's funds, which
the Bank manages by rationing credit at its own discretion
(Fukui, 1986; p. 5).
8. Fukui (1986, pp. 14-15) has identified three stages of
interbank market liberalization that have allowed greater
interest rate flexibility: (i) 1978-79, when the "quotation
system" for call and bill rates (in which money market
dealersoperated as brokers and consulted with porrowers
and lenders to determine "quotations" according to a
formula based on a consensus between borrowers and
lenders, changes in rates were infrequent) was abolished,
and a diversification of maturities of instruments traded
was developed; (ii) 1980-1982, when a liberalization of
controls allowed arbitrage opportunities to develop to link
the interbank and open markets; (iii) 1983 onward, when
there was a further relaxation of controls on various trans-
actions and introduction of new financial instruments.
9. The Bank of Japan is eager to expand the role of
Treasury bills in its money market operations because thebills are believed to offer the greatest degree of control.
That is, T-bill operations influence interest rates in open
markets directly whereas interbank rates are anindirect
means of influencing market rates. The T-bill marketnone-
theless remains undeveloped, and the Bank of Japan's
operatipnson these instruments are not conventional
"open market" operations. In particular, the BankofJapan
is reluctant to repurchase Treasury bills sold .to absorb
funds because ofits desiretoseelargerprivateholdingsof
these instruments.
10. According to an Executive Director of the Bank of
Japan, "... in money supply management, interbank rate
operations are the main tool, and window guidance is only
a supplementary or stopgap measure. With this attitude,
and in response to the growing monetary relaxation since
the middle of 1980, the Bank of Japan has permitted city
banks, long-term credit banks and all other financial inter-
mediaries to lend as they wish." (Shimamoto, 1982; p. 83).
11. The Bank of Japan has expressed its willingness to
reimpose credit controls on bank lending if controls seem
desirable, however.
12. Suzuki (1985), for example, notes that ... "Japan
also shifted to a money focus as its intermediate objective
in the last half of the 1970s" (p. 7-6). Moreover, Fukui
(1986) notes"... As for intermediate objectives of mone-
tary policy, emphasis has been placed on the control of
money supply instead of ceilings on increases in lending
by financial institutions to the non-banking sector"
(p.17).
13. The Bank of Japan publishes projections of the rate of
increasein the average outstanding M2 + CDs each quar-
ter over the corresponding quarter of the previous year.
These projections tend to move gradually over time. For
example, recent projection ranges were: 1978.3 - 1979.4,
11-12%; 1980.1 - 1981.2, 7-8%; 1981.4 - 1982,3, 9-10%;
and 1982.4 - 1983.4,8-9%.
14. Various Japanese policymakers and government
economists have emphasized the introduction of broad
money(M2 + CDs) as an importantintermediate indicator.
See, for example, Shimamoto, 1982; p. 82 and Suzuki,
1985; p. 5.
15. Hamada and Hayashi (1985) estimate money supply
equations as functions of lagged money growth, lagged
inflation, lagged industrial production growth, and lagged
reserves to test Barro's anticipated money neutrality
hypothesis. They find a significant shift in the function with
the move to floating exchange rates in February 1973, but
notat other potential shift points (December 1970, Decem-
ber 1973 or December 1974). There is doubt, however,
whether the direct approach of estimating money equa-
tions as functions of ultimate policyvariables to test for the
degree of "policy discretion can disentangle money sup-
ply from money demand influences. See DeRosa &Stern
(1977)
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16. Melt,zer (1985) notes that, in his estimation .forecast
error, variances foroutputand priceswere reduced follow-
ingtheBank of Japan's move to announce projections of
money growth. He suggests that these announcements, if
credible, increase information about money growth.and
reduce uncertaintY (p. 40). Seemingly atodds with this
interpretation, however, is that the variance of forecast
errors ofthe M1 money stockand money growth variability
generally increased after the move to announce projec-
tions (Meltzer, 1985; p. 15).
17. Fof<example, an Executive Director of the Bank of
Japan has stated that "... the Bank of Japan follows the
money supply not weekly, but rather monthly andquar-
terly" (Shimamoto, 1982; p. 81). The DirectoroftheBankof
Japan's Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, in
contrast, recently stated that, "there are three principal
features ofmonetary targeting as practiced bythe Bank of
Japan since 1975. First, broad money (M2 + CDs) is
chosen as themostimportant intermediatetarget.Second,
the period of targeting is not aweek, a month, oraquarter,
but a year. Third, the target is not announced, but the
forecast is announced quarterlyin terms of thepercentage
increase over the previous year in the average money
stock of the quarter concerned" (SUZUki, 1985; p. 5).
18. It is important to emphasize that, strictly speaking,
feedback from actual money changes as deviations from
the target range is what should be "causing" changes in
the call money rate when money targeting is followed.
However, as long as the target is not moved frequently, the
Granger tests presented in the test should capture this
variabilityfrom thetarget ranges. As footnote 13 indicates,
changes in the Japanese."monetary projections" have
been infrequent since 1978. Moreover, the Bank of Japan
emphasizes that money projections are not to be inter-
preted as money targets in the United States.
19. Okubo (1983), for example, deletes the period imme-
diately after 1973 "... to avoid the influence of the disor-
ganized quarters at the time of the first oil crisis"
(p.117).
20. This interpretation also has been expressed by a
number of Bank of Japan officials. For exam-
ple, ... "Thus, the attitude of Bank of Japan toward the
money supply is, in a word, pragmatic. Given uncertainty,
shifts in functions, and instabilities, we believe this stance
most appropriate to conditions at home and abroad."
(Shimamoto, 1982; p. 82).
21. See Cargill (in this Economic Review) for a detailed
discussion of the shift in the flows offunds in Japan and its
importance for increasing the role of direct finance, as
opposed to indirect finance working through the banking
system, in channeling funds from the surplus (household)
sector to the deficit sectors (government and corporate
sector) since the mid-1970s.REFERENCES
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